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The three exchange rate regimes adopted by Italy from 1883 up to the eve 
of World War I — the gold standard (1883-1893), floating rates (1894-1902), 
and  “gold  shadowing”  (1903-1911)  —  produced  a  puzzling  result:  formal 
adherence  to  the gold standard  ended in  failure while  shadowing the gold 
standard  proved  very  successful.  This  paper  discusses  the  main  policies 
underlying  Italy’s  performance  particularly  focusing  on  the  strategy  of 
reserve  accumulation.  It  presents  a  cointegration  analysis  identifying  a 
distinct co-movement between exchange rate, reserves, and banknotes that 
holds  over  the  three  sub-periods  of  the  sample.  Given  this  long-run 
relationship,  the  different  performance  in  each  regime  is  explained by  the 
diversity of policy measures, reflected in the different variables adjusting the 
system in the various regimes. Italy’s variegated experience during the gold 
standard  provides  a  valuable  lesson  about  current  developments  in  the 
international  scenario,  showing  the  central  role  of  fundamentals  and 
consistent policies.  
 
Keywords: Exchange rate; gold standard; reserve policy; cointegration.   







° Banca d’Italia; <filippo.cesarano@bancaditalia.it> 
+ Università di Firenze; <giulio.cifarelli@unifi.it> 
* Duke University, LUISS and CEPR; <giannit@econ.duke.edu> 
 
The authors are grateful to Barry Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau for their comments on a 
previous version of the paper.  
 





In the last decades of the nineteenth century, globalization was driven by 
several  forces:  communication  technology,  advances  in  transportation, 
technical progress, and the free movement of goods, capital, and labor. A 
further  important  factor  was  arguably  the  international  monetary  system. 
The rise of the gold standard provided a stable monetary framework that, 
anchoring the price level and preventing major payment imbalances, helped 
to realize the potential of the globalization process. This model of monetary 
organization allowed short-run flexibility but left little room to independent 
policies in the long run. Indeed, the gold standard  was the nearest thing to 
the ideal of a world money. 
In  a  seminal  paper,  Bordo  and  Rockoff  (1996)  pointed  out  the  benefits 
accruing to countries adopting the gold standard in terms of easier access to 
the  international  capital  market. Being  on  gold  enhanced  the  credibility of 
economic policies while offering an escape clause in case of emergencies.
1 
Subsequent  contributions  strengthened  the  Bordo  and  Rockoff  results 
(Sussman and Yafeh 2000; Obstfeld and Taylor 2003) while also stressing 
the role of debt burdens and economic growth (Flandreau and Zumer 2004) 
or political factors  (Eichengreen  1996; Ferguson 2003)  as determinants of 
risk premia. The “good housekeeping seal of approval” applied to the core 
countries, but peripheral countries too strove to comply with the rules of the 
game, albeit showing uneven performances.  
In this regard, Italy represents an interesting case which may lend itself to 
general considerations. Over a span of thirty years from 1883 to World War 
I,  Italy  experienced  three  different  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  1883  Italy 
reintroduced  de  jure  gold  convertibility  (suspended  during  the  1866  war), 
 
1 “If adherence to the rule was evidence of financial rectitude — like the ‘good housekeeping 
seal of approval’ — it would signal that a country followed prudent fiscal and monetary policies 
and would only temporarily run large fiscal deficits in well-understood emergencies. Monetary 
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which however was again suspended ten years later during a major currency 
and financial crisis. In the following decade, the lira was kept within the gold 
points  without  however  formal  commitment  to  convertibility.  The  case  of 
Italy therefore provides an in vitro experiment of  a peripheral country under 
alternative monetary regimes, with a puzzling result: formal adherence to the 
gold standard ended in failure while shadowing the gold standard was a great 
success. The solution of the puzzle hinges on the implementation of a policy 
design consistent with the  rules of  the game,  independently  of the  formal 
adherence  to  the  gold  standard.  Paradoxically,  for  a  country  with  a  poor 
reputation, the shadowing strategy proved a better course of action since it 
allowed  wider  policy  leeway,  useful  to  build  up  credibility  and  reap  the 
benefits of a stable exchange rate. 
Examining  the  alternating  vicissitudes  of  Italy’s  participation  in  the  gold 
standard,  this  paper  identifies  a  distinct  co-movement  between  exchange 
rate, reserves and banknote circulation that holds over the three sub-periods 
of  the  sample.  Given  this  long-run  relationship,  however,  the  different 
performance in each regime is explained by the diversity of policy measures, 
reflected  in  the  different  variables  adjusting  the  system  in  the  various 
regimes. 
After a brief account of the properties of the gold standard (section 1), the 
paper outlines the main features of the three exchange rate regimes adopted 
in  Italy  (section  2),  illustrates  the  role  of  reserve  management  policy  in 
shadowing  the  gold  standard  (section  3),  and  presents  a  cointegration 
analysis of the determinants of the three regimes (section 4). The concluding 
section discusses some implications of Italy’s pre-1914 experience for current 





authorities then could be depended on to avoid defaulting on externally held  debt” (Bordo and 
Rockoff 1996, 390).
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1. Economic policies and the Gold Standard 
 
A perplexing feature of the evolution of the international monetary system is 
the stability of the classical gold standard in contrast with subsequent fixed 
exchange rate regimes like the interwar gold exchange standard, the Bretton 
Woods system, the narrow-band EMS, and other forms of hard currency peg, 
like  currency  boards  and  dollarization.  That  fixed  gold  parities  were 
maintained  by  a  number  of  “core”  countries  in  a  world  of  free  capital 
movements for roughly four decades is indeed impressive in light of current 
experience. This stylized fact, Bayoumi and Eichengreen remark, “constitutes 
an analytical mystery and an important policy question” (1996, 165). 
The  classical  gold  standard  was  the  final  stage  of  commodity  money. 
Contrary to subsequent monetary arrangements, it was not designed at the 
drawing  board  but  developed  spontaneously,  driven  by  diverse  and  yet 
complementary factors — theory, market forces, technology, and the social 
and political environment — that shaped the rules of the game. The keystone 
of this construction was convertibility, providing a commitment mechanism to 
implement monetary and fiscal policies (Bordo and Kydland 1996), consistent 
with maintaining the gold parity and thus supposed to display a high degree 
of automaticity (Mundell 2000, 328).  
The  idea  of  convertibility  stemmed  from  classical  monetary  theory,  which 
viewed  money  as  a  commodity  and  the  economy  as  self-adjusting.  The 
exchange  rate  measured  the  currency’s  gold  content  vis-à-vis  other 
currencies and was therefore assumed to be invariable, not subject to policy 
choice.  In  fact,  gold  parity  was  not  supposed  to  be  altered  but  only 
suspended in exceptional circumstances such as a war or a financial crisis. 
Once  the  emergency  was  over,  the  restoration  rule  stipulated  the 
reestablishment  of  parity,  making  the  system  credible  (McKinnon  1993; 
Bordo  and  Kydland  1996).  Exchange  rate  invariance  was  a  distinctive 
property of commodity standards as opposed to fiat money standards. The 
arithmetic  of  relative  weights  of  gold  translates  into  the  economics  of  a   4 
credible  contingent  rule.  Since  a  change  in  parity  was  not  even 
contemplated, the policy design had to conform with this nominal anchor. 
Neither  the  escape  clause  nor  gold  “devices”  (McKinnon  1993,  4-6)  to 
overcome  transitory  shocks  were  expected  to  undermine  credibility  since, 
given the availability of information and the simplicity of rules, they could be 
easily monitored.
2 In case of an incipient reserve drain, an increase in the 
discount  rate,  prescribed  by  Bagehot’s  rule,  attracted  capital,  reining  in 
aggregate demand, because the exchange risk was assumed to be virtually 
nil.  The  stabilizing  character  of  capital  movements,  a  corollary  of  credible 
gold parities, was further enhanced by the assumption that no country, not 
even  Britain  was  in  a  position  to  influence  commodity  prices,  as  the 
international price level was determined by the world demand for and supply 
of gold. Since gold solved Mundell’s “redundancy  problem,” the system was 
symmetric  and,  given  the  limited  discretionary  power  of  monetary 
authorities, this solved the time inconsistency problem (McKinnon 1993, 10-
11). All in all, the properties underlying the successful performance of the 
gold standard, i.e. credibility, stability, and symmetry, reflected the rules of 
the game: the restoration rule, Bagehot’s rule, and the price level rule.  
The  success  of  the  gold  standard,  therefore,  had  its  roots  in  classical 
monetary  economics.  The  metallist  principle  squared  with  an  equilibrium 
model  in  which  there  was  no  room  for  policy  objectives  other  than 
maintaining  gold  parity.
3  This  theoretical  framework  nonetheless  granted 
significant  short-run  flexibility  precisely  because  of  the  system’s  long-run 
 
2  Bordo  and  Kydland  argue  that  the  gold  standard  was  successful  as  a  commitment  rule 
“because  it  had  the  virtues  of  being  simple  and  transparent”  (1996,  456).  Explaining  his 
preference for a convertible currency instead of an inconvertible currency regulated by keeping 
the  price  of  bullion  in  accordance  with  the  mint  price,  Mill  emphasizes  “the  importance  of 
adhering  to  a  simple  principle,  intelligible  to  the  most  untaught  capacity.  Everybody  can 
understand convertibility; every one sees that what can be at any moment exchanged for five 
pounds is worth five pounds. Regulation by the price of bullion is a more complex idea, and 
does not recommend itself through the same familiar associations” (1848, 546). 
3 As Eichengreen and Flandreau remark: “What pressure existed for the pursuit of other policy 
goals  was  exceptional  and,  ultimately,  limited.  At  the  gold  standard’s  European  and  North 
American core, its political, ideological, and economic underpinnings sufficed to sustain the 
system.  When  push  came  to  shove  and  the  authorities  in  these  countries  had  to  choose 
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credibility.
4  Conspicuous  shocks  and  crises  did  occur,  and  yet  the  lack  of 
major  hindrances  to  market  operation,  given  the  social  and  political 
environment,  ensured  rapid  adjustment,  avoiding  lasting  repercussions  on 
output and employment (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1996). Still, the discipline 
imposed by the rules of the game allowed but a handful of core countries to 
commit  to  convertibility.  Countries  on  the  periphery,  albeit  making  the 
adoption of the gold standard one of their main policy goals, could seldom 
achieve it. Vulnerability was to a large extent an effect of the weakness of 
the countries’ fundamentals — consistent fiscal and monetary policies, open 
and deep financial markets, a sound banking system — a set of conditions 
that Bordo and Flandreau (2003) have graphically synthesized as “financial 
maturity.” Peripheral countries would then be exposed to capital flight and 
financial crisis.  
The  periphery  of the  gold standard offered a variegated  picture. After  the 
crisis of the 1890s, in particular, solutions differed considerably, depending 
on  fundamentals  and  general  economic  conditions  (Bordo  2003,  24-33). 
Some countries continued  to float (Spain and Portugal), others developed de 
facto  currency  boards  (Russia  and  Greece),  some  shadowed  the  gold 
standard (Austria-Hungary and Italy) or tried to stay (on and off) on gold 
(Argentina). De jure adherence to the gold standard remained the ideal to 
aim at but, for most peripheral countries, building up credibility required a 
policy design both stricter and maintained for a longer period of time with 
respect  to  core  countries.  Hence,  in  the  absence  of  conditions  for 
implementing such a design, joining the gold standard was often ephemeral. 
In this connection, the difficulty of gaining credibility in international financial 
markets is shown by the small number of countries that issued debt abroad 
denominated in their own currency, and were thus immune from the “original 
 
between interest-rate increases to keep the gold standard from collapsing and interest-rate 
reductions to stimulate production, they never hesitated to opt for the former” (1997, 19). 
4 Obstfeld and Taylor  (2003, 262) find that in the inter-war years, in contrast to the gold 
standard  period,  countries  were  punished  for  running  high  public  debts,  which  shows  the 
policymakers’ greater room for maneuver during the gold standard. 
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sin,” in relation to the members of the gold standard. In fact, bonds issued 
by peripheral countries normally contained “gold clauses.” From the end of 
the nineteenth century, gold discoveries and sustained growth contributed to 
narrowing the gap between the core and peripheral countries, witnessed by 
the decrease in the interest rate differential and its variability (Obstfeld and 
Taylor  2003).  Nevertheless,  the  performance  of  the  periphery  remained 
highly diversified. While not officially returning to gold, Austria-Hungary and 
Italy  were  among  the  most  successful  ‘semi-peripheral’  countries  (Morys 
2007). 
The experience of Italy in the three decades preceding World War I provides 
an eloquent example that de jure commitment to convertibility per se does 
not  ensure  the  maintenance  of  fixed  parity  while  the  steady  pursuit  of  a 
policy  design  consistent  with  gold  standard  rules  does.  For  peripheral 
countries with a long history of bad reputation, shadowing the gold standard 
may well be the best strategy, since it might better shield it from speculative 
attacks  while  allowing  more  room  for  maneuver  in  short-run  policy 
implementation.  
 
2. Italy’s exchange rate regimes 
 
In 1862 an act of Parliament made the Piedmontese lira the country’s single 
currency.  Banknotes  were  convertible  into  either  gold  or  silver  but,  to 
prevent the effects of Gresham’s law  and  to  suit the needs of  the largest 
bank of issue (Banca Nazionale), which held mainly gold reserves, a new law 
was  passed  that  “introduced  a  gold-based  monometallism  in  disguise” 
(Fratianni  and  Spinelli  1997,  65).  Convertibility  was  suspended  during  the 
1866  war  against  Austria.  Despite  the  call  for  immediate  resumption  by 
prominent  economists,  only  in  April  1883  was  the  lira  again  made  legally 
convertible  (De  Mattia  1959;  Toniolo,  Conte,  and  Vecchi  2003).  In  the 
following  thirty  years  Italy  adopted  three  monetary  regimes:  the  gold 
standard (April 1883-June 1893), floating rates (July 1893-December 1902), 
and a regime of shadowing the gold standard from January 1903 to the end   7 
of 1913.
5 This sequence makes Italy an interesting case study of monetary 
arrangements  in  a  semi-peripheral,  developing  open-economy  during  the 
“first globalization.” 
In the early 1880s, the upswing in economic activity throughout Europe was 
also shared  by the Italian economy. The external deficit almost disappeared 
setting the scene for the return to gold. To make convertibility credible, the 
government negotiated with three international financial houses to obtain a 
644  million  lire  loan  (about  5  percent  of  Italy’s  GDP),  70  percent 
denominated in gold and the rest in silver. On the eve of resumption, the lira 
rapidly appreciated and remained within the gold points for the following four 
years (see Figure 1).
6 During this period, the price of Italian consols (Rendita 
Italiana) rose from an average of 88.32 lire in 1883 to a peak of 101.60 lire 
in  the  second  half  of  1886  (Supino  1921,  30).  Easy  credit  from  banks  of 
issue,  however,  pushed  down  both  the  reserve  ratio  and  interest  rates, 
fueling stock exchange and real estate speculation. By 1887, therefore, the 
lira  was  again  trading  above  the  export gold point. To  avoid or  limit note 
conversion,  the  banks  of  issue  resorted  to  administrative  measures  or 
“manipulation of the gold points” (Bloomfield 1959, 52) and the Government 
bought  substantial  amounts  of    consols  in  Paris  to  support  the  price  (De 
Cecco 1990; Di Martino 2001; Tattara 2003). 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
From the mid-1880s onward, domestic policies proved to be inconsistent with 
exchange  rate  stability  and  eventually  gold  convertibility.  Easy  money, 
 
5 Using cluster analysis, Garofalo (2005, 23-28) identifies a number of sub-periods within this 
broad tripartite division of the time span. For the two periods after the 1893 suspension of 
convertibility, he argues that cluster analysis allows us to distinguish between pure floating 
and managed floating on the one hand and between soft and crawling pegs on the other. 
6 By far the thickest foreign market for the lira and lira-denominated securities was the Paris 
stock-exchange.  The  profile  of  the  lira-sterling  exchange  rate  is,  however,  not  significantly 
different. Exchange rates are those for the last trading day in each month. Following Fratianni 
and Spinelli (1997), the gold points have been set at +/- 0.5% of the official parity. On the 
role  of  the  Paris  Bourse  in  setting  the price of  Italian  consols  and  its influence  on the  lira 
exchange rate, see De Cecco (1990), Di Martino (2001), and Tattara (2003).   8 
increasing  public  deficits,  lack  of  government  supervision  of  the  banks  of 
issue,  and  overtrading  by  commercial  banks,  compounded  by  the 
international financial crisis, prepared the ground for a major banking crisis, 
which  eventually  pushed  the  country  out  of  gold.  Some  of  the  most 
distinguished economists at the time  were critical about a policy of resorting 
to a foreign loan while failing to carry out measures consistent with the gold 
standard.  Vilfredo  Pareto  stressed  the  basic  principle  that  to  ensure    gold 
convertibility, currency circulation  must be reduced in order to restore the 
equilibrium price level.
7 Marco Fanno pointed out the drawbacks of the loan 
and  suggested  instead  a  decrease  in  fiduciary  money  through  budget 
surpluses as an alternative strategy for resumption (Fanno 1908, 98-105).
8 
Barone advanced similar arguments.
9 
The  main  flaws  of  the  resumption  strategy  were  also  perceived  by  some 
policymakers.  In  1890,  Luigi  Luzzatti  contended  that  consolidation  of  the 
public budget was a  necessary  measure to sustain  resumption  (De Cecco, 
1990, 712-15). An anonymous memorandum in 1892, attributed to Giacomo 
Grillo, director general of Banca Nazionale, highlighted the dire consequences 
of irresponsible policies following the return to gold.
10 Indeed, by the early 
 
7  “To  return  from paper  currency  to  metallic  currency  it is  therefore worth  withdrawing  as 
much paper money as necessary to reduce prices precisely to the level there would have been 
with  metallic  currency.  And  only  afterwards  can  metallic  money  be  substituted  for  paper 
money … . It is deduced that a foreign loan in gold to eliminate inconvertible paper currency is 
vain  and  harmful.  …  The  loan  can  be  useful  only  after  equilibrium  has  been  attained  by 
reducing the quantity of currency or, which comes to the same thing, by increasing trade and 
industry.  What  happened  in  Italy,  what  is  now  happening  in  Austria,  and  the  theory  of 
economic crises, all confirm these theoretical deductions” (Pareto 1894, 157; 169-170).  
8 Distinguishing between a foreign loan and a domestic loan, Fanno (1908, 90-97) points out 
that while the former increases reserves but does not restrict circulation, the latter does the 
opposite. By destroying the banknotes paid by subscribers to a domestic loan, the monetary 
authority can make the agio disappear, although it cannot resume convertibility for which a 
sizeable  reserve  is  needed.  To  achieve  this  objective,  the  decrease  in  the  stock  of  paper 
money must continue until the balance of payments is in surplus. Yet, this policy of sudden 
deflation may well bring about disruptive shocks to the economy. 
9 Building upon Fanno’s analysis, Enrico Barone, in a chapter eloquently titled “Countries with 
Rotten  Circulation,”  also  emphasized  the  central  role  of  fiscal  discipline  and  sound  bank 
portfolios in ending convertibility suspension (1918, 113-25).  
10 “That was the period [1883-97] … that, by abusing credit, excessive trust in our own forces, 
mistakes and aberrations which would be shocking today, prepared for the sad days to follow 
inasmuch as easy credit brought about the establishment of new industries and all sorts of 
speculations  heavily  fueled  and  vigorously  encouraged  by  cheap  capital. Grandiose  designs 
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1890s, inconsistent policy design led to abandoning the gold standard. The 
Baring Crisis did not seem to affect Italy’s bond yields and spreads until after 
mid-1891 (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2007, 36), but it may have triggered 
the flight to quality (De Cecco 1990, 49). The confidence crisis hitting semi-
peripheral  borrowers  compounded  on  domestic  problems  and  pushed  the 
exchange rate above the export gold point. 
 Both contemporary observers and some later-time historians saw the way 
the gold standard was introduced and managed as the root of the real estate 
bubble  and  bust  that  led  to  the  suspension  of  convertibility  in  1894. 
According to this view, the international loan of 1883 and the ensuing capital 
inflows produced an “atmosphere hyper-oxygenated by gold” in which banks 
could expand credit at interest rates that did not reflect the increasing risk of 
lending based on real estate security. This was made possible by an overly 
accommodating  monetary  stance  and  lax  bank  regulation  (Fratianni  and 
Spinelli 1997, 89-90). When housing prices crumbled leading borrowers to 
bankruptcy,  most  banks  –  including  banks  of  issue  –  found  themselves 
excessively burdened with illiquid assets. Small bank failures took place in 
the  late  1880s  followed by  the  liquidation,  in  the  early  1890s, of  the  two 
largest commercial banks. In 1892-93 one of the banks of issue was brought 
to  its  knees  amidst  a  fraud  scandal  that  also  had  major  political 
repercussions. 
 The lira exchange rate duly reflected the uncertainty of the economic and 
political situation and rapidly depreciated from 1891 to almost 16 per cent 
below parity in 1893, marking the start of the floating rate regime. It is not 
entirely clear, however, when the gold standard was legally suspended. The 
Bank Act of 1893 was unclear about the statutory obligation for the newly 
created Bank of Italy to convert notes into specie, indicating that conversion 
 
and grandiose public works, railways, and other projects undertaken by the government, were 
the  sorry  example  that  dragged    provincial  and  city  councils  and  private  citizens  to  push 
individual  and  collective  activities  to  the  limit  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ever  growing 
defense needs created by an insecure political situation in Europe obliged the government to 
reach levels of expenditures far exceeding the nation’s tax potential” (De Cecco, 1990, 782).  
   10 
rules would be issued at a later date. Ambiguity about lira convertibility was 
probably  intentional.  The  Parliamentary  Committee  Report  on  the  political 
responsibility  of  bank  failures  read:  “[I]n  present  circumstances,  if 
conversion  would  be  fully  effective,  metal  reserves  could  run  the  risk  of 
disappearing.  Conversely,  by  not  imposing  such  an  obligation,  it  could  be 
interpreted as a tacit acceptance of inconvertibility” (quoted in Fratianni and 
Spinelli 1997, 94). In the following years, this dilemma continued to haunt 
the minds of policymakers, long after the crisis had been overcome and a 
new climate of trust begun to surround Italy’s economy and politics.  
If  by  1895  the  banking  crisis  had  been  overcome,  it  took  longer  for  the 
country to redress the deeper economic, social, and political predicaments of 
the early 1890s, reflected in the exchange rate. The political turning point 
came  in  1896  (Toniolo  1990,  100)  with  the  defeat  of  the  Italian  army  at 
Adowa, Ethiopia, which, putting an end to the expensive policy of expansion 
in the Horn of Africa as well as to the semi-authoritarian regime of Francesco 
Crispi,  paved  the  way  to  a  new  liberal  political  order  and  reliable 
institutions.
11 The economic turning point came a year or two later: budget 
surpluses, accelerating growth, and  balance of payment surpluses led to a 
steady appreciation of the lira (Fanno 1908, 107-108; Supino 1921, 39-40). 
From 1903 to 1911, the exchange rate remained stable, fluctuating almost 
always within the gold points. 
The  change  in  policy  design  hinged  upon  the  political  will  to  renounce 
ephemeral  expedients  and  adopt,  instead,  a coherent  economic  strategy.
12 
Aggressive fiscal consolidation, tight monetary discipline, and the restoration 
 
11  A  new  Bank  Act  was  passed  after  which  the  Bank  of  Italy  was  reorganized,  giving  the 
government  a  prominent  role  in  appointing  the  bank’s  management  and  supervising  its 
operation. Two new large commercial banks were created to fill the void left by those that had 
failed in 1893. 
12 Praising the shrewd conduct of Bonaldo Stringher, at the helm of the Bank of Italy from 
1900  to  1930,  Corbino  noted  that,  in  carrying  out  his  successful  monetary  stabilization, 
Stringher had “the help and political support of men like Giolitti, Sonnino, and Luzzatti all of 
whom had the profound conviction that it was necessary to consider the period of weaknesses 
and banking adventures as definitively closed and look at the monetary system as a means to 
foster the country’s economic growth, provided that it was used without artifice and political 
interference” (1938, 389).   11 
of  a  sound  banking  sector  soon  produced  a  substantial  improvement  in 
fundamentals.
13  As  a  result  of  these  policies,  the  exchange  rate  remained 
firmly  within  the  gold  points.  The  authorities  however  decided  to  shadow 
rather  than formally  reintroduce  the  gold  standard.  The  important  novelty 
was  the  time  consistency  with  which  macroeconomic  policies  were  carried 
out.  Policymakers refrained  from  impromptu  measures  that tampered with 
the  rules of  the game  until the outbreak of  World War I. Such unyielding 
rigor was instrumental in building up the credibility of gold parity in a country 
with a history of dubious reputation. The theory underlying this objective was 
quite  clear  to  contemporary  economists  and  policymakers.  According  to 
Supino (1921, 62-68), exchange rate fluctuations depend on the quantity of 
fiduciary money and the balance of payments, but primarily on the “trust in 
the  state,”  as  regards  the  country’s  public  finances,  growth,  wealth,  and 
political stability. In the same vein, Stringher, reporting to the shareholders 
meeting in March 1903, stressed the reversal of expectations and its impact 
on  the  exchange  rate,  brought  about  by  the  improvement  in  the  public 
finances, growth in savings and output, repayment of domestic and foreign 
debt, and increasing emigrant remittances.
14 The link between fundamentals 
and  credibility  in  a  gold  standard  regime  was  well  understood  by 
contemporaries.  From  the  end  of  the  19
th  century  onward,  credibility  was 
consistently pursued also by accumulating huge reserves.  
 
 
13 In the 1897-1913 period, the ratio of debt to GDP fell from 128.0 to 77.2 per cent and the 
share of foreign debt from 22.2 to 9.5 per cent (Francese and Pace 2008). As early as 1903 a 
foreign observer, the French economist Arthur Raffalovich, remarked: “Italy … , with precise 
measures and secure methods that could be taken as a model, brought the exchange rate to 
its definitive level. The Italian government has spoken little, knowing that in monetary policy 
the less discussion the better. It has persevered with tenacity to improve the public finances. 
For his part, the skillful Director General of the Bank of Italy was able to mend past faults, 
sacrificing the popularity that he would have won from the Bank’s shareholders by increasing 
the  dividend  for  a  more  substantial  result.  Success  has  crowned  this  resolute  and  truly 
patriotic conduct and it is not without legitimate pride that we can see that today the lira is 
equal to the franc, i.e. it is worth gold” (quoted in Corbino 1938, 391). 
14 “All this was fortunately reflected in the price of foreign exchange. Financial and economic 
factors  together  with  the  steady  improvement  of  banks’  circulation,  soon  determined  the 
disappearance of the agio. The psychological element contributed  powerfully and rapidly to 
   12 
3. Reserve management and the exchange rate, 1903-1911 
 
If the legal obligation to convert paper into gold remained vague and, in any 
event, was never enforced, a 40 per cent reserve requirement was however 
mandated on the Bank of Italy and the other two junior banks of issue.   
 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
Convinced that large reserves were crucial to the stability of the exchange 
rate, from the turn of the century onward, the Bank of Italy stuck to a policy 
stance  that,  sacrificing  both  shareholders’  interests  and  macroeconomic 
expansion, continuously raised the stock of metallic reserves. The reserve to 
banknote ratio rose from 34 per cent in 1899 to 60 per cent in 1913, well 
above  the  mandatory  coverage  requirement  (see  Figure  2).
15  The 
improvement in Italy’s international financial position is also reflected in the 
u-shaped curve of the financial mismatch index (Bordo and Meissner 2005), 
equal to the ratio between international reserves net of total hard currency 
debt  outstanding  –  defined  as  the  fraction  of  total  public  debt  which  is 
serviced in gold – and the value of exports (see Figure 3). After 1903, the 
“mismatch” converges falling almost to zero.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
If  the  lira  exchange  rate  remained  within  the  gold  points  almost 
uninterruptedly,  the  reintroduction  of  a  legal  commitment  to  convertibility 
was never publicly debated. This ambiguous and cautious attitude was partly 
 
this result while at other times, it contributed instead to keeping the exchange rate too high. ” 
(Banca d’Italia 1903, 7-8).  
15 The series in the graph are in thousands of lire. The reserve requirement rose from 33 to 40 
per cent in August 1893. The banks were allowed, however, to use up to seven percent of 
their issue of notes to discount foreign bills labelled in a convertible foreign currency. In 1895 
their deposits in foreign banks and their holdings of foreign sovereign bonds payable in gold 
were  considered  akin  to  specie  reserves.  Figure  2  shows  a  conservative  40  per  cent  gold 
coverage requirement from 1893 onwards.    13 
motivated by feelings of insecurity: the successful turn in policy strategy (see 
note 13) could not suddenly erase  the memory of the 1893 currency crisis. 
The steady accumulation of reserves aimed at preventing the repetition of 
the event, buttressing convertibility while  providing for growth of fiduciary 
money.
16  Thus,  recalling  the  dramatic  crisis  of  1892-93,  Bank  of  Italy 
Bonaldo  Stringher  warned  about  the  need  of  “timely  preventing  painful 
relapses,” adding: “The Bank of Italy intends to persevere in the measured 
and prudent conduct followed in the past years, when … she increased her 
gold reserves by more than 300 million” (Banca d’Italia 1906, 55-56). The 
quest  for  patience  and  prudence  was  reiterated  ad  nauseam.  Even  after 
monetary stabilization had long been completed, Stringher still vowed not to 
resort to “artifices” in monitoring the foreign exchange market (Banca d’Italia 
1909, 54; 1911, 49; 1913, 11). 
But  insecurity    was  by  no  means  the  prevailing  motivation  for  shadowing 
rather than legally committing to the gold standard. For a semi-peripheral 
country  still  characterized  by  financial  weakness,  shadowing  the  gold 
standard may well have  been the  best course of  action to  strengthen  its 
position  and  withstand  potentially  disruptive  shocks.  Contemporary 
policymakers  understood  this  point  very  well.  By  avoiding  an  official 
commitment to convertibility, a not yet entirely credible country, endowed 
with  large  reserves,  would  be  in  a  more  comfortable  position  to  avoid 
speculative attacks. Italy’s performance during the most severe crisis of that 
period, the worldwide liquidity crunch of 1907, vindicated the strategic choice 
of the previous years. 
The 1907 crisis was potentially disruptive to the Italian economy owing to the 
strong ties between German-type universal banks and most of the country’s 
large  utility  and  manufacturing  companies.  The  reckless  lending  and  risky 
 
16 These objectives were clearly stated from the very beginning. The growth in reserves had 
the “double aim of increasing the ratio between the metallic guarantee and the value of bills in 
circulation,  and  making  a  greater  amount  of  exchange  media  available  to  the  market, 
widening the paper circulation entirely covered by specie and thus independent of the normal 
limit  of circulation.  In  short, in increasing  measure,  a  part  of  our bills  has  been  given  the 
   14 
stock market operations which led to the liquidation of the third largest bank 
(Società Bancaria Italiana) posed a serious threat both for the financial and 
the real side of the economy. A serious risk existed that the insolvency of 
Società  Bancaria  Italiana  would  be  transmitted  to  its  industrial  customers 
and, by contagion, to the two other large credit institutions and their client 
companies. Prompt action by the Bank of Italy, as lender of last resort, and a 
loan from the Treasury defused the threat.  These were made possible by the 
fact  that  “the  Bank  of  Italy  was  in  such  a  strong  position  that  it  could 
increase circulation without negative effects on the size of its reserves or the 
exchange rate” (Bonelli 1971, 52). No economy-wide credit crunch resulted 
from providing all the liquidity needed by the ailing banks. Throughout the 
crisis  the  lira  remained  within  the  gold  points.  Stringher,  noticing  that  in 
1907 the discount rate had been raised to 5.5 per cent, its highest level since 
1894, proudly added: “But what a difference between this rate, applied by us 
for a few months only, and the rates other countries had to apply in order to 
protect their metal reserves: the Bank of England set its rate to 7% and the 
Imperial Bank of Germany to 7.5%” (Banca d’Italia 1908, 27). 
Besides the important episode of the 1907 crisis, the huge and continuous 
drop in the interest rate differential between the Rendita and British consols, 
which  fell  from  a  mean of  251  basis  points  in  1894  to  19  basis  points  in 
1913, also testifies to Italy’s success in shadowing the gold standard.  
 
4. Exchange rate, reserves, and circulation: stylized findings 
 
The  relationship  between  the  lira  exchange  rate  and  key  gold  standard 
variables — banknotes in circulation and metallic reserves — is investigated 
in this section. That monetary authorities deemed these variables as closely 
interrelated and essential to successfully shadow the gold standard is vividly 
depicted in a graphical appendix to the 1914 Annual Report of the Bank of 
 
function of deposit certificates of gold purchased abroad in order to  better  satisfy the new 
needs of the national economy” (Banca d’Italia 1903, 13).   15 
Italy. In particular, Figure 4 shows the inverse relationship between the lira-
franc  exchange  rate  and  the  reserve  to  banknote  ratio  over  twenty  years 
(1894-1913), reflecting the fundamental principles underlying the workings 
of the gold standard. 
                                       
<INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE> 
 
The  aim  of  the  statistical  analysis  is  straightforward.  Having  identified  a 
coherent behavioral pattern for the de jure members of the gold standard, an 
analogous pattern should hold if, as maintained in the previous section, the 
authorities were successful in their shadowing policy and achieved de facto 
lira  convertibility  in  the  first decade of  the  twentieth  century.  For  reasons 
already explained (see note 6 above) we take the lira-franc exchange rate to 
be  the  most  appropriate  measure.  The  analysis  is  carried  out  at  monthly 
intervals  (data  are  for  the  last  business  day  of  each  month).  The  sample 
spans from January 1883 to December 1911. It is divided into three sub-
periods: (i) the gold standard (from January 1883 to December 1893), (ii) 
floating rates (from January 1894 to December 1902) and (iii) the shadowing 
policy (from January 1903 to December 1911).  
 
4.1. A VECM investigation 
 
As  Italy’s  adoption  of  an  exchange  rate  regime  was  neither  clear-cut  nor 
persistent, we do not know a priori whether the three time series mentioned 
above  —  exchange  rate,  reserves,  and  banknotes  —  are  exogenous  or 
endogenous. Of course, in a textbook model of the gold standard, reserves 
are endogenous and so are banknotes. However, as discussed above, both 
note  issue  and  reserve  levels  turned  out  to  be  policy  instruments.  The 
exchange rate, in turn, becomes endogenous whenever the gold standard is 
abandoned  in  favor  of  free  floating.  The  difficulty  of  introducing  a  priori 
hypotheses is compounded by the peculiar financial positioning of the country 
vis-à-vis the gold standard. Italy was on the periphery of the system and the   16 
monetary authorities did not hesitate to manipulate the variables mentioned 
above directly.  
Thus, at this stage of the analysis, we treat all three variables as potentially 
endogenous  and  investigate  their  behavior  over  time  with  the  help  of  a 
vector  autoregressive  parameterization.  A  preliminary  assessment  of 
stationarity of the time series over the full sample and the three sub-samples 
mentioned above is called for, along with an analysis of cointegration if two 
or  more  of  them  are  found  to  be  I(1).    The  currency  and  banking  crisis 
preceding  the  abandonment  of  the  gold  standard  in  1893  brought  about 
sudden changes in the level of the time series, which did not depend on the 
dynamics  of  their  correlation  structure,  so  that  the  corresponding  outliers 
may  well  be  considered  additive.  The unit  root  tests  (Table A.1)  are  thus 
performed using the robust statistic by Ng and Perron (2001).
17 The tests 
suggest  that  the  logarithm  of  the  monthly  exchange  rate,  reserves,  and 
banknotes are I(1) in the time periods under investigation. We implemented 
the  test  procedure  of  Perron  and  Rodríguez  (2003)  and  identified  several 
additive outliers. The value of the test statistics that are significant at the 5 
per cent level and the corresponding dates are set out in the Appendix (Table 
A.2).  Cointegration  analysis  is  then  implemented  using  Johansen’s 
multivariate approach (1991).
18 
The (small sample adjusted) trace statistics, set out in Table 1, identify in 
each  time  period  a  single  cointegration  relationship  among  the  three  I(1) 
variables  t e log ,  t s Re log  and  t Not log , where  t e  is the lira-franc exchange rate 
 
17 Additive outliers introduce a moving average component with a negative coefficient into the 
residuals of standard unit root test estimates which, in turn, inflates the size of the test and 
brings about over-rejection of the null of non-stationarity. 
18 Additive outliers may also distort inference on cointegration rank in finite samples. Following 
the  interpolation  strategy  suggested  by  Nielsen  (2004),  the  outlying  observations  are 
eliminated and replaced by an average of the respective adjoining data. The smoothed time 
series will then be used in the cointegration analysis below.    17 
(number of liras per franc),  t s Re  is the stock of total reserves
19 and  t Not  is 
the stock of banknotes in circulation.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
The following Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) are then estimated in 
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where F  is a n x 1 vector of constant terms, and  j G  is a matrix of distributed 
lag coefficients.  b  and a  are n x m matrices of adjustment coefficients and 
cointegration equation coefficients respectively, n = 3 being the number of 
I(1)  time  series  in  t X ,  viz.  t e log ,  t s Re log ,  and  t Not log ,  and  m  =  1  the 
number of cointegrating relationships. We have thus n - m = 2 nonstationary 
common trends that drive the system of jointly endogenous variables. 
 
4.2. Error correction dynamics on and off the gold standard 
 
Each VECM describes the behavior over time of the monthly rate of change of 
the  exchange  rate,  the  stock  of  reserves,  and  the  stock  of  banknotes  in 
circulation. The VECM diagnostics of Table 2 are satisfactory and suggest that 
the appropriate number of lags — also used in the Johansen cointegration 
tests above — has been selected, an important finding since, as shown by 




19 Non-metallic reserves, equal to zero in the first sub-period, went up to 20 per cent of total 
reserves in 1900 and then progressively decreased to 7 per cent in 1913. 
20 We follow Urbain (1995) and base the choice of the VECM order on the absence of serial 
correlation of the residuals.   18 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
A  preliminary  question  is  whether  the  choice  of  the  three  sub-periods 
mentioned above is justified by the model behavior. The answer is definitely 
positive.  Figure  5  shows  a  plot  of  the  full  sample  “known  cointegration 
vector”  recursive  test  for  cointegration  parameter  constancy  proposed  by 
Hansen  and  Johansen  (1993).
21  Two  results  stand  out:  (i)  the  long  run 
cointegration vector estimates are unstable if the VECM is re-estimated at 
each iteration, with shifts that correspond with accuracy to the dating chosen 
for  the  three  sub-samples  of  the  paper  (continuous  line);  (ii)  the 
cointegration relationship estimates become marginally stable if the long run 
coefficient vectors a and  b  only are reestimated at each iteration, while the 
short  run  VECM  coefficients  are  maintained  at  their  full  sample  estimated 
values (dotted line). We conclude that the two regime shifts are due more to 
the short run than to the long run components of the VECM. A homogeneous 
economic interpretation of the latter over the three sub-samples may thus be 
justified.  (Full  sample  estimates  of  the  VECM  used  in  the  parameter 
constancy analysis are available from the authors upon request.)     
 
<INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE> 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
A second question deals with the structure of the error correction process in 
the  three  sub-periods.  Preliminary  information  on  long  run  dynamics  is 
provided by the Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests for weak exogeneity set out in 
 
21 The test is meant to assess if the full sample estimate is contained in the space spanned by 
the  recursive  i a estimates.  Formally  the  hypotheses  tested  are  T T i sp H i i ,..., ), ( ˆ : 0 0 = Î a a a , 
wherea ˆ  is the full sample cointegration vector estimate and  0 T  is the January 1883-December 
1885 base period. The last recursive estimation is equal to the full sample one. The null is thus 
that the cointegration vectora estimate at each recursive iteration is not statistically different 
from  the  full  sample  one,  which  has  the  lowest  sample  variance.  It  is  asymptotically 
distributed here as a 
2 c with m(n-m) degrees of freedom.    19 
Table 3.
22 In the January 1883-December 1893 and January 1903-December 
1911 sub-periods, the exchange rate and the stock of banknotes are weakly 
exogenous  for  the  long-term  cointegration  coefficients  in  a ,  while  in  the 
January 1894-December 1902 sub-period, reserves and banknotes turn out 
to be weakly exogenous.
23 These findings are central to the paper’s message 
and merit further discussion. 
These  results  are  corroborated  by  the  estimates  of  the  error  correction 
coefficients  of  Table  2,  which  correspond  to  a  normalization  of  the 
cointegrating vector with the exchange rate coefficient.
24 The entries of the 
error correction vector  b  identify the variables that shift in order to restore 
equilibrium.  Indeed,  a  variable  plays  a  role  in  the  adjustment  required  to 
return  to  the  long-run  equilibrium  after  a  shock  if  the  error  correction 
coefficient  is  significantly  different  from  zero  (and,  obviously,  of  the 
appropriate sign) in the corresponding dynamic equation of the VECM. 
In the first sub-period the error correction coefficient is significantly different 
from zero in the dynamic relationship which parameterizes the rate of change 
of  reserves. The latter bring the long-run relationship between the level of 
reserves, the exchange rate, and banknotes back to equilibrium, as should be 
the case in a gold standard regime with free international capital movements. 
The Italian case is more complex since, from 1886 onwards, the adjustment 
pattern reflects various attempts to support the price of Rendita in Paris as 
mentioned in section 2 above. 
In  the  second,  free  floating,  regime  (January  1894-December  1902), 
adjustment is brought about, as expected, by the exchange rate. The error 
 
22 Neither the “known cointegration vector” stability test nor the LR tests for weak exogeneity 
are affected by the normalization of the cointegrating vector. 
23 We test  to see if any of the variables in  t X is weakly exogenous with respect to a , i.e. if it 
does  not  adjust  to  the  long  run  disequilibrium  error.  Formally,  we  test  the  null 
n i and m j H ij ,..., 1 ,..., 1 , 0 : 0 = = = b , where m = 1 is the number of cointegration relationships 
and n = 3 is the number of variables in  t X .  The test is asymptotically 
2 c distributed with  m 
degrees of freedom.  
24  A  tentative  economic  interpretation  of  the  cointegration  relationships  is  set  forth  in  the 
Appendix.   20 
correction coefficient is significantly different from zero in the exchange rate 
equation of the VECM. 
The third sub-period, the gold shadowing regime (January 1903-December 
1911), provides some interesting results. The error correction terms of both 
the exchange rate and reserve change relationships are different from zero. 
The  former,  however,  has  the  wrong  sign  and  has  a  very  small  absolute 
value. Moreover, the joint hypothesis that the error correction terms of both 
the exchange rate and banknote rate of change relationships are nil cannot 
be rejected at the standard level of significance (the corresponding LR test, 
distributed as 
2 c  with two degrees of freedom, is 3.776 with a probability  
value of 0.15). Reserves play a dominant role, as in the official gold standard 
regime of 1883-1893, in restoring the long-run equilibrium after a shock. The 
monetary and fiscal policies mentioned in the previous section, along with 
emigrant remittances, restored the country’s international financial balance 
and the lira-franc exchange rate fluctuated within the gold points (see Figure 
1).  The  reserve  change  equation  error  correction  coefficient  is  larger  in 
absolute value than in the first sub-period, and the speed of adjustment of 
reserves  after  a  shock  to  the  cointegration  equilibrium  relationship  has 
increased.  This  finding  may be  associated  with  the  policy of  large  reserve 
accumulation implemented by the Bank of Italy and the ensuing integration 
of the country in the international financial system.  
There is a final point to be made about the role of the stock of banknotes. It 
is  always  weakly  exogenous,  which  suggests  that  the  banking  authorities 
were able to control the monetary base irrespectively of the exchange rate 
regime.  If  this  finding  is  not  unduly  surprising  as  regards  the  second 
(inconvertibility) regime, this is not the case for the first. Indeed, in a gold 
standard framework the availability of reserves should constrain the supply of 
banknotes.  Their  exogeneity  suggests  that  banks  were  somehow  able  to 
hinder  convertibility,  from  1887  onwards,  with  the  help  of  moral  suasion 
and/or  alternative  administrative  measures.  In  the  third  sub-period, 
exogeneity is due to the rapid growth of the stock of reserves. As shown in   21 





Italy’s  case  prior  to  the  First  World  War  may  be  seen  as  an  in  vitro 
experiment  of  the  relations  between  three  key  policy  variables  across 
different exchange rate regimes in a semi-peripheral country. 
Our empirical findings corroborate the hypothesis of the existence of three 
distinct  exchange  rate  regimes  from  1883  to  1911.  In  the  gold  standard 
period (1883-1893) the exchange rate was weakly exogenous, and so was, 
less obviously, money circulation, indicating that banks of issue were able to 
manipulate convertibility. Reserves were endogenous. Under the floating rate 
regime (1894-1902) circulation and reserves were weakly exogenous while 
the  exchange  rate  was  naturally  endogenous.  Finally  during  the  gold 
shadowing  years  (1903-1911)  the  causality  structure  replicated  the  one 
found  under  the  gold  standard:  reserves  were  endogenous  while  the  two 
other variables were weakly exogenous. 
The contrast between the failure of de jure return to gold in the first sub-
period  and  the  success  of  shadowing  gold  in  the  third  one  points  to  the 
crucial  role  of  policies  and  fundamentals  in  maintaining  an  exchange  rate 
regime.  The  mere  commitment  to  convertibility,  per  se,  did  not  ensure 
exchange  rate  stability,  while  the  implementation  of  a  consistent  policy 
framework did, even in the absence of de jure convertibility. In 1883 Italy 
took out a huge foreign loan before resumption but did not carry out policies 
consistent with  convertibility.  The  return to gold was therefore  doomed to 
fail.  At  the  turn  of  the  century,  on  the  contrary,  a  time  consistent  policy 
design  was  pursued  until  the  eve  of  World  War  I,  which  allowed  policy 
makers to effectively mimic the gold standard. 
Nowadays  the  issues  are  essentially  the  same,  although  they  appear  in  a 
different  shape.  In  the  absence  of  the  clear-cut  rules  of  commodity 
standards,  credibility becomes all  the more  crucial  to  the viability  of  fixed   22 
exchange rates.
25 Like Italy a century ago, today some peripheral countries 
informally peg to a reserve currency, a policy analogous to gold shadowing, 
trying  to  build  up  credibility  through  macroeconomic  policies  and  the 
accumulation  of  international  reserves  to  withstand  liquidity  crises  and 
overcome the “fear of floating.”
26 
For peripheral countries, therefore, the choice of exchange regime may well 
be  a  “mirage”  (Calvo  and  Mishkin  2003)  inasmuch  as  the  achievement  of 
macroeconomic  goals  does  not  relate  to  the  choice  itself  but  to  sound 
fundamentals,  adequate  financial  institutions,  and  consistent  policies. 
Building up reserves is part of this strategy in that it provides an effective 
shield against crises originating from domestic credit markets and exchange 
markets, i.e. from both internal and external drain.
27 In this regard, Italy’s 
variegated  vicissitudes  during  the  gold  standard  teach  a  valuable  lesson. 
Only after the abandonment of ad hoc measures having ephemeral effects, 
was  Italy  able,  by  implementing  a  long-run  strategy  based  on  rigorous 
 
25 Drawing attention to the influence of political factors, Obstfeld and Taylor stress the same 
point:  “[I]f  we  seek  lessons  from  the  past,  our  results  have  some  implications  for  today’s 
attempts to gain capital market credibility through the use of pegged exchange rates. It is 
clear that the post-World War One political developments that rendered interwar exchange-
rate commitments less credible have not receded in the meantime. Thus, policymakers should 
not  expect  to  gain  market  credibility  even  through  seemingly  irrevocable  exchange  rate 
commitments.  In  the  absence  of  robust  fundamentals  and  complementary  economic  and 
institutional  reforms,  efforts  to  forswear  discretionary  exchange  rate  changes  are  of 
questionable value” (2003, 266). The central role of credibility is definitely reflected in the 
effectiveness of capital mobility. During the gold standard, capital movements were a major 
stabilizing factor because the exchange rate risk was virtually nil. From the inter-war years 
onward, the waiving of key rules weakened credibility and capital flows became a major source 
of  instability.  Hence,  the  “analytical  mystery”  stressed  by  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen, 
contrasting the stability of the gold standard with subsequent fixed exchange rate regimes 
(see  the  beginning  of  section  1  above),  is  accounted  for  by  the  changed  nature  of  the 
monetary system. 
26 Bordo and Flandreau emphasize the similarity of the problems affecting peripheral countries. 
“If going on gold was so costly for the periphery, one may wonder why a number of countries 
nonetheless  sought  to  stick  to  gold.  We  argue  that  this  choice  rested  on  something  quite 
similar  to  the  current  fear-of-floating  dilemma.  If  fixing  was  quite  painful  under  the  gold 
standard for many of the peripheral countries, floating could be just as deadly as today. This 
was  due  to  pervasive  problems  of  currency  mismatch  arising  from  the  inability,  for 
underdeveloped  borrowing  countries,  to  issue  foreign  debts  in  their  own  currency”  (2003, 
436). 
27 This twofold objective of reserve policy was clearly stated by Stringher (see footnote 16). In 
a  recent  paper,  Obstfeld,  Shambaugh,  and  Taylor  (2008)  trace  back  this  hypothesis  to 
Thornton and Keynes, corroborating it with panel data analysis covering the 1980-2004 years 
and 134 countries.   23 
policies and reserve accumulation, to successfully shadow the gold standard 
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Note. The plot above the critical value suggests that the null, that the cointegration vector estimate from 
the  corresponding  recursive  estimation  interval  is  not  statistically  different  from  the  full  sample 
cointegration vector estimate, has to be rejected. The null hypothesis is accepted in the 1892 - 1904 sub-
sample  and  rejected  in  the  remaining  sub-periods  if  each  VECM  is  reestimated  at  each  iteration. It  is 
marginally  accepted  if  the  long  run  coefficients  only  are  recursively  estimated,  since  the  short  term 
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Table 1: Johansen cointegration tests 
Trace test statistics 

































at most 1 





























at most 1 






























at most 1 





























at most 1 





















Notes. *: denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level; ° the critical values are adjusted 
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Table 2: Error correction coefficients 
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k
j




1 '                             (1) 
   
                 VECM equation 
 
Lira-Franc  Dependent 
Variable 


















LB Q-test for 
serial correlation 





0.01 (lag 1) 
[0.91] 





3.51 (lag 1) 
[0.06] 






0.10 (lag 1) 
[0.75] 






















LB Q-test for 
serial correlation 




0.78 (lag 1) 
[0.38] 






0.19 (lag 1) 
[0.66] 























LB Q-test for 
serial correlation 






0.09 (lag 1) 
[0.76] 






0.06 (lag 1) 
[0.82] 





0.00 (lag 1) 
[0.98] 









Notes.  *:  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  5  percent  level;  t  ratios  are  in  parentheses  and 




Table 3: Likelihood ratio tests for weak exogeneity 
 





























Notes.  Probability values in square brackets; *: significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Ng Perron (2001) unit root tests* 
 
  January 1883 
December 1911 
  January 1883 
December 1893 
t e log  
C, lag 9 
-1.81  I(1) 
t e log  
C, t, lag 0 
-1.96  I(1) 
t s Re log  
C, t,  lag 11 
-0.87  I(1) 
t s Re log  
C, t, lag 11 
-0.58  I(1) 
t Not log  
C, t, lag 15 
-0.32  I(1) 
t Not log  
C, t, lag 6 





t e log  
C, t, lag 1 
-1.88  I(1) 
t e log  
C, lag 4 
-1.36  I(1) 
t s Re log  
C, t, lag 0 
-1.87  I(1) 
t s Re log  
C, t, lag 12 
-0.72  I(1) 
t Not log  
C, lag 9 
-1.28  I(1) 
t Not log  
C, t, lag 1 
-2.13  I(1) 
 
Notes. *: The  GLS-detrended  autoregressive spectral density estimator of  the  frequency zero spectrum 
uses the modified AIC to select the number of lags. Critical values with constant,  C, and trend, t:  -3.42 
(1 percent), -2.91 (5 percent); with constant without trend: -2.58 (1 percent), -1.98 (5 percent). 
 
Table A.2: Perron Rodríguez (2003) additive outliers tests* 
 
 
d t   Time 
period 
 
d t   Time 
period 
 
































Notes. *: Critical values of the  d t  test statistic of Perron and Rodríguez (2003, 203): with no trend, 4.20 
(1 percent), 3.75 (5 percent).  t s Re log and  t Not log  are trending and the corresponding critical values 
are:  4.19 (1 percent), 3.74 (5 percent). 
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Table A.3: Cointegration equation estimates 
t t t t Not b s b e e r = - - - log Re log log 2 1 0  
 
  Lira-Franc 




























Note.  t  ratios are in parentheses. 
 
 
A tentative economic interpretation of the cointegration relationships  
              
The  investigation  of  the  economic  interpretation  of  a  cointegration 
relationship is seldom straightforward. For a given cointegration rank, m, the 
cointegration vectors are the eigenvectors that correspond to the m largest 
solutions of  the  eigenvalue equation  in  the Johansen estimation procedure 
(Johansen, 1995, theorem 6.1, equation 6.15, 93) and have to be normalized 
in  order  to  acquire  an  economic  significance.  A  standard  procedure  is  to 
divide  each  coefficient  of  the  cointegrating  vector  by  the  coefficient  of  an 
adjusting variable, i.e. of a variable which reacts to the disequilibrium error 
having a non zero error correction coefficient in the corresponding equation 
of  the  VECM.  In  some  cases,  however,  a  strong  a  priori  economic 
interpretation of the cointegration equation suggests a normalization with the 
coefficient of a weakly dependent variable, i.e. of a variable which has an 
error correction coefficient in the VECM that is not significantly different from 
zero.
28 In our case the exchange rate policies implemented by the monetary 
 
28 For examples in the literature, see Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) among many others.      36 
authorities might provide an economic justification for this normalization. An 
emerging market country, Italy was at the margin of the gold standard and 
the  automatisms  of  the  latter  did  not  apply.  The  authorities  carefully 
monitored  the  exchange  rate,  controlling  both  the  process  of  reserve 
accumulation  and  the  issue  of  banknotes.  The  writings  of  Pareto  (1894), 
Fanno  (1908),  and  Barone  (1918)  set  forth  in  section  2  provide  a  lucid 
discussion of this proposition. 
 
<INSERT TABLE A.3 HERE> 
 
Table A.3 sets out the estimates of the cointegrating equation of the VECM 
estimates of section 4.2 above. The cointegrating vector is always normalized 
with the coefficient of the exchange rate even if the latter is the adjusting 
variable  only  in  the  January  1894  -  December  1902  time  period.  The 
resulting parameter estimates are always significant and of the appropriate 
sign:  an  exchange  rate  appreciation  is  associated  in  the  long  run  with  an 
increase  in  the  stock  of  reserves  and  with  a  decrease  in  the  stock  of 
banknotes and vice versa in the case of depreciation of the exchange rate. 
There is but little evidence of changes in regime: if the estimated parameters 
tend  to  become  smaller  in  absolute  value,  their  sign  however  does  not 
change. As shown by the stability tests above, the exchange rate regimes 
seem to have affected the short run more than the long run aspects of the 
analysis.  
              
 